







This note is motivated by recent arguments made by Martin
Feldstein in which the relevance of inequality is dismissed
(if everybody's income goes up, who cares if inequality is
up too?), and the argument is made that only poverty
alleviation  should matter. This note shows that we all do
care about inequality, and to hold that we should be
concerned with poverty solely and not with inequality is
internally inconsistent. 
                                                
1 Development Researh Group, World Bank and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington. I am grateful to Samuel Bowles, Karla Hoff, James K. Galbraith and Thomas Pogge for very
helpful comments. The views are author’s own, and should not be attributed (no way!) to the World Bank
and its affiliated organizations.2
This note addresses the argument recently put forward by Professor Martin
Feldstein (1998, 1998a, and virtually identically in Feldstein, 1999) regarding the
irrelevance of inequality issues as opposed to poverty.  No one should be worried,
Professor Feldstein argues, about greater inequality so long as everybody’s income is
increasing. It is only with incomes of those who are poor that economists need to be
concerned. This is an argument not infrequently heard.  As someone who has worked on
the issues of inequality for more than twenty years, I had had a chance to see it expressed
quite a few times. In the early 1990’s, the then  director of research in the World Bank
dismissed my proposal for a study of inequality in post-Communist countries arguing that
these countries were “victims” of unreasonable egalitarianism, and all increases in
inequality, linked as they must be to higher returns to more productive members of
society (yes! that was the belief at the time)  should be welcome. Four or five years later,
with the greatest recorded peacetime increase in poverty, and inequality hitting the
ceiling, the subject did not seem so unreasonable. In many social parties or professional
meetings in Washington and elsewhere, when introduced to and informed that I worked
on inequality, my (more polite) interlocutors would make a point similar to Feldstein’s
(“why should inequality matter at all”); others, perhaps less polite, would wave their
hands basically ascribing the fact that anyone would pay a person to study inequality to
profligate ways of international bureaucracy.   I will allow myself to speculate at the end
of the note, why the topic of inequality produces such strong reactions among many
people from various lands and backgrounds.  But before I do so, I will try to make a few
more substantive points, although, following Professor Feldstein, I too will eschew to
base my case on the functionalist arguments in favor of low inequality of the median-
voter, social stability or perversion of political process, or market failure
2 (lack of wealth
which prevents people from making successful investments in their own education or a
project) type.
3
                                                
2 I am grateful for this to Karla Hoff who surveys the market failure literature in Hoff (1996).
3 Two excellent reviews on the effects of inequality on a wide range of economic and social issues are
Thornbecke and Charumilind (2002) and Jencks (2002).3
Is it envy or  is it  justice? Consider Professor Feldstein’s example. If each of us
were given $1,000, inequality (in the US) would go up, and yet we, gathered here, would
be better off and no-one would be worse off. So, what is wrong with it? Apparently,
nothing. Let us now modify his example just a bit. Let us suppose that Feldstein’s fairy
gives me $20,000 and each of you is given variously between 25 and 75 cents. Professor
Feldstein’s previous conclusions still hold: everybody’s welfare should be greater. Yet,
the effects, I dare suggest, would be quite different. Many of you might refuse to accept
your quarter, some might leave it in the room, other throw it away in disgust. Many
would comment (unfavorably) upon fact that I have received, for some unfathomable
reason, $20,000, while other, much more worthy members of the group, would have to do
with less than 1/1000
th of that amount. Most of you would speculate on the reasons which
lie behind such an extravagant largesse on the part of the fairy.  
What this story illustrates? First, that many (most) of those who would have
received 25 cents would not merely not feel better—as professor Feldstein suggests they
should—but would rather feel worse. They would feel worse off because their feeling of
justice and propriety would have been hurt. And it will have been hurt because people
always compare themselves to (what they hold to be) their peers. Thus income they
receive is not only a means whereby to acquire more goods and services, it is also a
tangible recognition of how society values them. It is a social expression of their own
worth. Hence a large (and particularly if unjustified or unclear) difference in income will
be viewed as a slight on their own worth.
4 The key point is that income of others enters
our own  utility function. And once we allow for it, inequality affects our own welfare
and  the arguments regarding irrelevance of inequality come to naught. 
                                                
4 It is an intriguing language point that one would have expected that the correct question one asks in
English regarding a person’s wealth would be “how much are Mr. X’s assets worth.” This however is
abridged to “how much is Mr. X worth.” The intrinsic worth of the individual and his extrinsic wealth are
conflated.4
Note that the concept of a peer group is crucial for all studies of inequality.
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There is no point in studying inequality between two groups that do not interact or ignore
each other’s existence. Suppose that we combine all Japanese and all Maya of the 15
th
century and study their combined inequality. The two groups might overlap quite a lot,
their mean incomes being similar. But this exercise is devoid of any meaning since the
two groups have never interacted. It is only when (say) a nation state appears and when
people tend to view their co-citizens as their equals that conventional studies of within-
country inequality started making  sense. This is why, I think, that studies of global
inequality make sense now, but much less so for the earlier periods. In other words, only
if there were no peer groups—that is, if there were no society—would inequality be
irrelevant and would only our own income matter for our welfare.
6
But let me try to find some other, perhaps, more convincing examples. Let us
assume that the organizer of this conference has decided to pay each of the participants a
fee reflecting his or her position in the profession and thus the expected quality of the
paper. And let us assume that such honoraria are widely skewed, but are all, of course,
positive. Let me now assume that I among all of you got the least, and by a large fraction.
Would this not affect my own sense of justice? I would quickly begin comparing fees
received by other authors to their published record or to what I have heard of them; I
would inquire from my friends, and I might end up being deeply offended. Again, my
feelings of (1) justice and (2) self-worth would be affected. In the first example, many
people might dismiss in disgust their quarter of a dollar; in this case, I would accept my
honorarium but would be quite upset and perhaps offended. Even if my welfare is greater
after the honorarium  (because my income would be higher) it will have increased far less
                                                
5 The same point is made by Sen (2000, p.64) who uses the concept of “reference group”: “the focus [of
welfare measurement] is on the utilities of the individuals only in that group, without any direct note being
taken of the utilities of others not in the group.”
6 A nice example how peer groups matter is provided by the following example. World Bank has many
local offices in different parts of the world. Staff who are recruited to work there are generally paid much
more than their local peers. So, they are very happy to work for the World Bank. But, after a few years,
they realize that they are paid only a fraction of what an identical economist is paid if hired by the
headquarters in Washington. Then locally-recruited  staff become very unhappy and demoralized, their peer
group having changed.5
than if everyone received the modest fee that I got, or if the fees were more in line with
what I perceive to be just. And  again, once we accept the fact that my welfare is reduced
by the knowledge of how much other participants received, we conclude that other
people’s income enters my utility function, and thus that inequality matters.
If this were not the case, how would we explain the fact that in the ultimatum
games, where participants are asked to share an amount of money, offers  perceived as
unfair are rejected out of hand, and both people end worse off (Fong, Bowles and Gintis,
2003). 
7 Why do people reject offers they hold unfair if thereby they reduce, not only the
income of the other participant, but their own too? Simply because the utility gain from
higher income is outweighed by the utility loss, that is by the feeling of injustice
stemming from the realization that the other person would receive a much greater, and in
our view, undeserved  income. But clearly we should never behave like that if we were
unconcerned with incomes of others. 
Notice that in all three examples, we have shown that people’s welfare depends
on income of others, but that the mechanism by which this is expressed varies. In the first
(“the good fairy”) example, we were puzzled by the capriciousness of the fate; in the
second example (“the fee”) we called upon justice; in the third example, we were simply
disgusted at the behavior of our partner—neither justice nor fate entered there: pure
human disgust or anger.
More arguments. Some economists tend to regard all statements that other
people’s incomes influence our welfare as statements of envy. Professor Feldstein speaks
of “spiteful egalitarianism.” Two points are, I think, worth of note here. First, ethics is not
the province of economists. The use of value-laden terms like “envy” is supposed to shut
us up by basically telling us that only green-eyed envious monsters are likely to covet
                                                                                                                                                
7 In the ultimatum game, two people are supposed to divide a given amount of money. Person A makes a
proposal. Person B accepts it or rejects it. If he rejects it, both participants receive nothing. Overwhelming
experimental evidence shows that offers amounting to less than 30 percent of the pie are rejected. The
experiments have been conducted in a number of countries and settings with stakes as high as three
months’ earnings (quoted in Fong, Bowles and Gintis, 2003, p.8). 6
other people’s money. Let us grant them this point: envy is not nice. But if most, many,
or a significant percentage of people do feel envious of other people’s money, this is the
only thing with which economists need to concern themselves. (And recall, that envy
simply means that other people’s income enters our  utility function). Envy, whether
economists approve of it in private or not, must enter into their analysis. Perhaps,
ethicists and religious ministers would disprove of such practices, and we leave the field
open to them to improve the human race. When the ministers have done so, economists
should go back to their assumptions, and wipe out income of others from their welfare
functions. But not before we are informed that envy has been rooted out. 
Second, what some people call envy is, as I believe the above examples have
shown, not (the bad) envy but (the good) sense of justice. We are affected by income of
others not solely because we are envious but because we think that injustice has been
done. And sometimes—reinforcing my point—we are affected by low income of others
in comparison to some yet different group although none of that affects us directly at all:
it is simply that we feel that somebody has been taken advantage of or has been treated
unfairly.
In other words, one person’s envy is another person’s justice. But whatever name
they come in, whatever rubric we write them in (“desirable “ or “non-desirable” feelings),
such feelings can be shown, I think, overwhelmingly to exist, and that is all that matters
to people who deal with human nature as it is.
Let me close this section with two quotes that illustrate very well the difference in
economists’ views regarding inequality. First, a fairly recent quote by Ann Krueger,
currently the vice-president of the IMF:
Poor people are desperate to improve their material
conditions in absolute terms rather than to march up the
income distribution. Hence it seems far better to focus on
impoverishment than on inequality. 7
 a position echoed by Professor Feldstein. And then the one by Simon Kuznets
(1965, p. 174), an old quote from 1954: 
One could argue that the reduction of physical misery
associated with low income and consumption
levels…permit[s] an increase rather than a diminution of
political tensions, [because] the political misery of the
poor, the tension created by the observation of the much
greater [income] growth of other communities... may  have
only increased.
Why people don’t like inequality? When I started working on inequality I lived in
a Communist country. My dissertation was on the topic of inequality. This was, what was
then euphemistically called, a “sensitive topic.” The rulers and their acolytes did not like
it because it exposed their myth of universal equality under socialism. They wanted
socialism to be perfect and equal, and it was shown to be imperfect and unequal. When I
came to live in a capitalist society, rich people (and their supporters) similarly tended to
object to the topic. They felt that any inequality that existed was right, since in their view
every income was fine, just and necessary, as if  God-ordained (market having taken over
the role of God). Empirical studies were superfluous.  The studies could merely sow
trouble and discord and possibly lead to the  questioning of the existing social order. As
under Communism, they were subversive. Thus the elites in both systems tended to agree
that studies of  inequality are unnecessary: in one case because they revealed that there
was inequality, in the other because they implicitly questioned whether its level was
acceptable. 
But such a high level of sensitivity toward empirical work on inequality shows, I
think, that our implicit assumption, probably derived from the centuries of religious
upbringing and Enlightenment, is that all people are basically the same and that it is every
departure from equality that needs to be justified. In other words, the elites are not
unreasonably concerned about studies of inequality: because every mention of inequality
raises in our minds questions about its acceptability.8
Why caring about poverty and not about inequality is implausible? If inequality
were not something we cared about, it is also very difficult to explain the concern with
poverty. For if (1) all incomes are just, or if (2)  other people’s incomes do not enter my
welfare function, why should I care if there are many poor people? Or even if only (2)
holds, why should existence of poverty matter to me? A person might reply that one
might still disprove of studying inequality but find that concern with poverty is
worthwhile because welfare of the poorest could be of concern since we hold that
everyone should be endowed with some minimum standard of living. But if this is the
case, isn’t this equivalent to saying that it is only the welfare of some (viz. the poor) that
enters my utility function and nobody’s else (except mine or my family’s). So a
proponent of concern with poverty does not disagree that other people’s incomes enter
his utility function; he just wants his homo oeconomicus to limit his attention to some
people (the poor) and to disregard others. The inconsistency of a position which cares
about poverty and does not care about inequality is readily spotted if we write i-th
person’s welfare function as 
) , , ... , , ... , , ( yz yw yx yk yj yi yc yb ya fct Wi =
where all individuals’ incomes are ordered so that yb>ya etc. To say that one cares
about poverty means that his (i-th) welfare function is affected by everything that
happens below some arbitrary income level (say d) where the poor dwell, while any
income change above d (except his own yi) leaves him indifferent. This of course is not
entirely impossible but seems to me quite implausible. As soon as we  extend our gaze
toward other people, richer than yd, and let their incomes influence own welfare too, we
move from concern with poverty alone to concern with inequality as well. 
To reinforce the argument for this rather implausible concern with y<yd only, a
moralistic gloss is put over it whereby the concern for all incomes less than yd  is deemed
“good” since it shows a  person to be concerned with the plight of the poor, while his
Concern Envy9
concern with all incomes greater than his is deemed to be morally reprehensible. In
reality, however, people are much more likely to think and be concerned with those who
have more than they than with those who have less. In other words, it is “envy” which is
much more likely to enter our welfare function that “concern.” 
I would be willing to venture an even stronger statement, namely that a very
different treatment of poverty and inequality favored by some economists, a sharp
distinction drawn between the two, is a way of deflecting possible raising of  the issues of
social desirability of a given distribution of income into a much more benign channel:
ostensible concern with the very poor. The concern with poverty is a price that the rich
are willing to pay so that no one questions their incomes. In other words, concern with
poverty works like an anesthetics to the bad conscience of the many. It is basically
“social money laundering”, an activity engaged into by those who have either acquired
wealth under dubious circumstances, or have inherited it, or might have made more
money than seems socially acceptable.  It could well be that less than savory ways of
acquiring wealth are unavoidable and that this is the price we have to pay for progress
and civilization.  “A world without poverty” is a world that would underwrite all kinds of
injustice. Unavoidable it may be—but it still should not stop us from recognizing it for
what it is. 10
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